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Abstract
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n2) steps
to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case (with n
women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved
in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole input. A partial
negative answer was given by Ng and Hirschberg, who showed that Θ(n2) queries are required
in a model that allows certain natural random-access queries to the participants’ preferences. A
significantly more general — albeit slightly weaker — lower bound follows from Segal’s general
analysis of communication complexity, namely that Ω(n2) Boolean queries are required in order
to find a stable marriage, regardless of the set of allowed Boolean queries.
Using a reduction to the communication complexity of the disjointness problem, we give a
far simpler, yet significantly more powerful argument showing that Ω(n2) Boolean queries of
any type are indeed required for finding a stable — or even an approximately stable — mar-
riage. Notably, unlike Segal’s lower bound, our lower bound generalizes also to (A) randomized
algorithms, (B) allowing arbitrary separate preprocessing of the women’s preferences profile and
of the men’s preferences profile, (C) several variants of the basic problem, such as whether a
given pair is married in every/some stable marriage, and (D) determining whether a proposed
marriage is stable or far from stable. In order to analyze “approximately stable” marriages,
we introduce the notion of “distance to stability” and provide an efficient algorithm for its
computation.
Keywords: stable marriage; stable matching; approximately stable; communication complexity;
distance to stability.
1 Introduction
In the classic Stable Marriage Problem [11], there are n women and n men ; each woman has a
full preference order over the men and each man has a full preference order over the women. The
challenge is to find a stable marriage : a one-to-one mapping between women and men that is
stable in the sense that it contains no blocking pair : a woman and man who mutually prefer each
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other over their current spouse in the marriage. Gale and Shapley [11] proved that such a stable
marriage exists by providing an algorithm for finding one. Their algorithm takes Θ(n2) steps1 in
the worst case [11], but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case, over independently and uniformly
chosen preferences [35].
In 1976, Knuth [19] asked whether this quadratic worst-case running time can be improved upon.
A related question was put forward in 1987 by Gusfield [14], who asked whether even verifying the
stability of a proposed marriage can be done any faster. As the input size here is quadratic in n,
these questions only make sense in models that do not require sequentially reading the whole input,
but rather provide some kind of random access to the preferences of the participants.
While Knuth’s and Gusfield’s questions arose from computational concerns, they also have
tangible economic significance. In many real-world matching mechanisms, it is unreasonable to
expect participants to provide their full preference list over all alternatives. This is not merely due to
the effort of writing down an immense ordered list of alternatives, but also due to the sheer cognitive
or physical effort of forming these preferences (for example, by conducting interviews). Formally,
the process of forming or revealing one’s preferences can be modeled as “querying” the individual’s
(perhaps implicitly defined) preferences. Each query consists of answering a single question about
the individual’s preferences that requires only a short response.2 Thus, the inherent complexity of
a marriage mechanism can be measured by the number of queries necessary to participate in the
mechanism.
A partial answer to both Knuth’s and Gusfield’s questions was given by Ng and Hirschberg
[24], who considered a model that allows two types of unit-cost queries to the preferences of the
participants: “what is woman w’s ranking of man m?” (and, dually, “what is man m’s ranking of
woman w?”) and “which man does woman w rank at place k?” (and, dually, “which woman does
man m rank at place k?”). In this model, they prove a tight Θ(n2) lower bound on the number of
queries that any deterministic algorithm that solves the stable marriage problem, or even verifies
whether a given marriage is stable, must make in the worst case. Chou and Lu [6] later showed
that even if one is allowed to separately query each of the log n bits of the answer to queries such
as “which man does woman w rank at place k?” (and its dual query), Θ(n2 log n) such Boolean
queries are still required in order to deterministically find a stable marriage.
These results still leave two questions open. The first is whether some more powerful model may
allow for faster algorithms. While many “natural” algorithms for stable marriage do fit into these
models, there may be others that do not. Indeed, there exist problems for which “computationally
unnatural” operations, such as various types of hashing, arithmetic operations, or even “cognitively
natural” operations such as processing through a neural network, do give algorithmic speedups.
Further, it may be the case that the participants’ preferences are only defined implicitly by their
actual input. For example, a participant’s type could be a point in some (possibly high dimensional)
geometric space, such that they prefer to be married to partners whose types are geometrically close
to their own (see, for example, [5, 4]). In this case, a natural query may be of the form “what is
your type’s kth coordinate?” Thus, it is of interest to ask whether an algorithm that queries the
actual (geometric) input can be significantly more efficient than one that only queries the implicitly
defined preferences.
The second question concerns randomized algorithms: can they do better than deterministic
1For a brief introduction to computer-science notation such as Θ(n2), Ω(n2), and O(n2), see Appendix A.
2The requirement that responses are “short” rules out, for example, the possibility of a participant being asked
their entire preferences with a single query. In our analysis, we consider Boolean queries, i.e. queries are “yes/no”
questions. Other models (e.g. that of Ng and Hirschberg [24]) consider queries with slightly longer (O(logn)-bit)
responses. This difference in the response size of allowed queries can only affect the complexity by at most a factor
of the length (number of bits) of the longest response.
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ones? This question is especially fitting for the stable marriage problem as the expected running
time is known to be small when the preferences are chosen uniformly at random.3 We give a
negative answer to both hopes, as well as several other related problems, thereby showing that
answering a wide variety of basic questions related to stable marriages requires a quadratic number
of queries (that is, requires querying nearly the entire preference structure):
Theorem 1.1 (Informal, see Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2). Any randomized (or deterministic) algorithm
that uses any type of Boolean queries to the women’s and to the men’s preferences to solve any of
the following problems requires Ω(n2) queries in the worst case:
(a) finding an (approximately) stable marriage,4
(b) determining whether a given marriage is stable or far from stable,
(c) determining whether a given pair of participants is contained in some/every stable marriage,
(d) finding any εn pairs of participants that appear in some/every stable marriage.
These lower bounds hold even if we allow arbitrary preprocessing of all the men’s preferences and
of all the women’s preferences separately. The lower bound for Part (a) holds regardless of which
(stable or approximately stable) marriage is produced by the algorithm.
Our proof of Theorem 1.1 comes from a reduction to the well-known lower bounds for the
disjointness problem [18, 28] in Yao’s [36] model of two-party communication complexity (see [20]
for a survey). We consider a scenario in which Alice holds the preferences of the n women and Bob
holds the preferences of the n men, and show that each of the problems from Theorem 1.1 requires
the exchange of Ω(n2) bits of communication between Alice and Bob.
We note that Segal [33] shows by a general argument that any deterministic or nondeterministic5
communication protocol among all 2n participants for finding a stable marriage requires Ω(n2) bits
of communication. Our argument for Theorem 1.1(a), in addition to being significantly simpler,
generalizes Segal’s result to account for randomized algorithms,6 and even when considering only
two-party communication between Alice and Bob (essentially allowing arbitrary communication
within the set of women and within the set of men without cost). Furthermore, our lower bound
holds even for merely determining whether a given marriage is stable or far from stable (Theo-
rem 1.1(b)), as well as for the additional related problems described in Theorem 1.1(c,d). These
results immediately imply the same lower bounds for any type of Boolean queries in the original
computation model, as Boolean queries can be simulated by a communication protocol.
As indicated above, Theorem 1.1(a), as well as the corresponding lower bound on the two-party
communication complexity, holds not only for stable marriages but also for approximately stable
marriages. In the context of communication complexity, Chou and Lu [6] also study such a relax-
ation of the stable marriage problem in a restricted computational model in which communication
3In particular, this would be the case if the expected running time could be made small for any distribution on
preferences, rather than just the uniform one.
4Our notion of “approximately stable marriage” is that the marriage shares many married couples with some
stable marriage; see Definition 2.5 for a formal definition and a discussion, and Section 6 for proof of tractability of
this notion.
5We use the term “nondeterministic,” as is customary in computer science, to refer not to randomized (i.e.
probabilistic) algorithms, but rather to algorithms that, roughly speaking, need only verify the correctness of the
output (rather than search for it). The precise definition, which is out of scope for this paper, is not required in order
to follow the main text of this paper. See [20] for a comparison of different models of communication complexity.
6We remark that in general, there may be an exponential gap between deterministic, nondeterministic, and
randomized communication complexity.
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is non-interactive (a sketching model). Chou and Lu show that any (deterministic, non-interactive,
2n-party) protocol that finds a marriage where only a constant fraction of participants are involved
in blocking pairs requires Θ(n2 log n) bits of communication. Our results are not directly compa-
rable to these, as the two notions of approximate stability are not comparable. Furthermore, we
use a significantly more general computation model (randomized, interactive, two-party), but give
a slightly weaker lower bound.
Our lower bound for verification complexity (given in Theorem 1.1(b)) is tight. Indeed there
exists a simple deterministic algorithm for verifying the stability of a proposed marriage, which
requires O(n2) queries even in the weak comparison model that allows only for queries of the form
“does woman w prefer man m1 over man m2?” and, dually, “does man m prefer woman w1 over
woman w2?”
7 We do not know whether the lower bound is tight also for finding a stable marriage
(Theorem 1.1(a)). Gale and Shapley’s algorithm uses O(n2) queries in the worst case, but O(n2) of
these queries require answers of log n bits each. Thus, the algorithm requires a total of O(n2 log n)
Boolean queries, or bits of communication. We do not know whether O(n2) Boolean queries suffice
for any algorithm. While the gap between Gale and Shapley’s algorithm and our lower bound is
small, we believe that it is interesting, as the number of queries performed by the algorithm is
exactly linear in the input encoding length. An even slightly sublinear algorithm would therefore
be interesting.8 We indeed do not have any o(n2 log n) algorithm, even randomized and even in the
strong two-party communication model, nor do we have any improved ω(n2) lower bound, even for
deterministic algorithms and even in the simple comparison model.9
Open Problem 1.1. Consider the Comparison model for stable marriage that only allows for
queries of the form “does man m prefer woman w1 over woman w2?” and, dually, “does woman w
prefer man m1 over man m2?”. How many such queries are required, in the worst case, to find a
stable marriage?
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 The Stable Marriage Problem
2.1.1 Full Preference Lists
For ease of presentation, we consider a simplified version of the model of Gale and Shapley [11].
Let W and M be disjoint finite sets, of women and men , respectively, such that |W | = |M |.
Definition 2.1 (Full Preferences).
1. A full preference list over M is a total ordering of M .
2. A profile of full preference lists for W over M is a specification of a full preference list
over M for each woman w ∈W . We denote the set of all profiles of full preference lists for W
over M by F(W,M).
7By simple batching, this verification algorithm can be converted into one that uses only O( n2
logn
) queries, each
of which returns an answer of length logn bits (with each query still regarding the preferences of only a single
participant). This highlights the fact that the lower bounds of [24] crucially depend on the exact type of queries
allowed in their model.
8Note that, as shown in Appendix E, the nondeterministic communication complexity is Θ(n2), so proving higher
lower bounds for the deterministic or randomized case may be challenging.
9It is interesting to note that Bei et al. [3] identify a similar gap for the stable marriage problem in a dramatically
different computation model of trial and error.
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3. Given a profile PW of full preference lists for W over M , a woman w ∈ W is said to prefer
a man m ∈M over a man m′ ∈M , denoted by m w m′, if m precedes m′ on the
preference list of w. We say that w ∈ W weakly prefers m over m′ if either m w m′ or
m = m′.
We define full preference lists over W and profiles of full preference lists for M over W analogously.
Definition 2.2 (Perfect Marriage). A perfect marriage between W and M is a one-to-one
mapping between W and M .
Definition 2.3 (Marriage Market). A marriage market (with full preference lists) is a quadruplet(
W,M,PW , PM
)
, where W and M are disjoint, |W | = |M |, PW ∈ F(W,M) and PM ∈ F(M,W ).
Definition 2.4 (Stability). Let
(
W,M,PW , PM
)
be a marriage market and let µ be a perfect
marriage (between W and M).
1. A pair (w,m) ∈ W ×M is said to be a blocking pair (in (W,M,PW , PM)) with respect to
µ, if each of w and m prefer the other over their spouse in µ.
2. µ is said to be stable if no blocking pairs exist with respect to µ. Otherwise, µ is said to be
unstable .
2.1.2 Arbitrary Preference Lists
While our main results are phrased in terms of full preference lists and perfect marriages, some
additional and intermediate results in Section 4 and in the appendix deal with an extended model,
which allows for preferences to specify “blacklists” (i.e. declare some potential spouses as unaccept-
able) and for marriages to specify that some participants remain single. (This model is nonetheless
also a simplified version of that of [11].) A (not necessarily full) preference list over M is a
totally-ordered subset of M . We once again interpret a preference list as a ranking, from best to
worst, of acceptable spouses. We interpret participants absent from a preference list as declared
unacceptable, even at the cost of remaining single. Analogously, a profile of preference lists
for W over M is a specification of a preference list over M for each woman w ∈ W ; we denote
the set of all profiles of preference lists for W over M by P(W,M) ⊃ F(W,M). In this extended
model, a woman w is said to prefer a man m over a man m′ not only when m precedes m′
on the preference list of w, but also when m is on the preference list of w while m′ is not. Again,
if we say that w weakly prefers m over m′ if either w prefers m over m′ or m = m′. (We once
again define preference lists and profiles of preference list for M over W analogously.)
A (not necessarily perfect) marriage between W and M is a one-to-one mapping between a
subset of W and a subset of M . Given a marriage µ, we denote the set of married women (i.e. the
subset of W over which µ is defined) by Wµ; we analogously denote the set of married men by Mµ.
For a marriage µ to be stable (with respect to PW and PM ), we require not only that no blocking
pair exist with respect to it, but also that no participant p ∈ W ∪M be married to someone not
on the preference list of p.
We note that this model of arbitrary (not necessarily full) preference lists generalizes the model
of full preference lists described in Section 2.1.1. Indeed, if the preference list of each participant
happens to contain all participants of the opposite gender, then the two notions of stability agree.
In particular, any marriage that is stable with respect to such preference lists prescribes that no
participant remains single.
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2.1.3 Known Results
We now survey a few known results regarding the stable marriage problem, which we utilize through-
out this paper. For the duration of this section, let
(
W,M,PW , PM
)
be a marriage market, defined
either according to the definitions of Section 2.1.1 or according those of Section 2.1.2.
Theorem 2.1 (Gale and Shapley [11]). A stable marriage between W and M always exists. More-
over, there exists an M -optimal stable marriage, i.e. a stable marriage where each man weakly
prefers his spouse in this stable marriage over his spouse in any other stable marriage.
Gale and Shapley [11] provide an efficient algorithm for finding the M -optimal stable marriage.
Their algorithm runs in Θ(n2) steps in the worst case, performing a query of Θ(log n) bits in each
step. Hence, the Gale-Shapley algorithm queries Θ(n2 log n) bits in the worst case.
Theorem 2.2 (McVitie and Wilson [23]). The M -optimal stable marriage is also the W -pessimal
stable marriage, i.e. every other stable marriage is weakly preferred over it by each woman.
Corollary 2.1 (W -pessimal &M -pessimal⇒ unique). If a stable marriage is both the W -pessimal
stable marriage and the M -pessimal stable marriage, then it is the unique stable marriage.
Theorem 2.3 (Roth’s Rural Hospitals Theorem [30]). Wµ (resp. Mµ) is the same for every stable
marriage µ.
2.1.4 Approximately-Stable Marriages
In this section, we describe a notion of an “approximately stable marriage.” For ease of presenta-
tion, we restrict ourselves to marriage markets with full preference lists (i.e. the model described in
Section 2.1.1). We define an approximately stable marriage as a perfect marriage that shares many
married pairs with some (exactly) stable (perfect) marriage. Our definition is a natural general-
ization of that of U¨nver [34] (who considers only marriage markets with unique stable marriages),
but it appears to be novel in its exact formulation. Our notion of approximate stability has the
theoretical advantage of being derived from a metric on the set of all perfect marriages between W
and M .
Definition 2.5. For any pair of perfect marriages µ, µ′ between W and M (where |W | = |M | = n),
we define the divorce distance between µ and µ′ to be10
d(µ, µ′) = n− ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣ .
Note that d measures the minimum number of divorces required to convert µ to µ′ (and vice versa).
By abuse of notation, we denote the divorce distance to stability of a perfect marriage µ to be
d(µ) = min
µ′∈M
d(µ, µ′)
where M is the set of all stable perfect marriages between W and M . Thus, d(µ) is the minimum
number of divorces required to convert µ into a stable marriage.
We say that a marriage µ is (− ε)-stable if d(µ) ≤ εn. We say µ is ε-unstable if d(µ) > εn.
10Abusing notation, we identify a perfect marriage µ with the set of married pairs
{(
w1, µ(w1)
)
,
(
w2, µ(w2)
)
, . . .
}
.
Thus, µ ∩ µ′ is the set of pairs (couples) that are married in both µ and µ′.
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Example 2.1. d(µ) = 0 if and only if µ is stable. Therefore, for ε = 0 the concepts of 1-stability
and 0-instability coincide precisely with (exact) stability and instability, respectively. Letting ε
grow, (1− ε)-stability is a weaker requirement for larger values of ε, while ε-instability is a stricter
requirement for larger values of ε.
When only a single stable marriage exists (in this case, as noted above, our definition of ap-
proximate stability coincides with that of U¨nver [34]), efficiently computing the divorce distance
to stability of a given perfect marriage µ is straightforward: first use the Gale-Shapley algorithm
to compute the M -optimal stable marriage (which in this case is the unique stable marriage), and
then calculate the divorce distance between this (unique) stable marriage and µ. Unfortunately,
this computation fails to generalize. Brute-force computation of d(µ) by iterating over all stable
marriages is infeasible for general preferences, because the set of all stable marriages M can be
exponentially large [19, 17, 15]. Nonetheless, by exploiting the combinatorial structure of M, we
show that d(µ) can still be efficiently computed (albeit in slightly slower time O˜(n4)). We describe
an algorithm to this effect in Section 6. We believe this algorithm to be of independent interest.
The concept of divorce distance is perhaps most valuable in developing our understanding of
the qualitative behavior of exactly stable marriage mechanisms. Given that (as our results on
exact stability show) finding an exactly stable marriage requires very high communication (or al-
ternatively, a very large number of queries), one may consider dynamic mechanisms that refine
their output over time until reaching a stable marriage. Such mechanisms would produce some
initial (not necessarily stable) marriage after an initial stage of communication/queries, and then
after additional communication/queries, adjust the marriage to form a stable marriage.11 If the
social cost of each divorce due to this adjustment is high, then we would want to minimize the
number of divorces in the second stage of the mechanism. That is, we would seek a marriage with
small divorce distance to stability in the first stage, and would seek to replace it with the closest
stable marriage in the second stage. The analysis of Section 6 implies that if such a first stage
can be constructed, then a corresponding second stage can be implemented in a computationally
efficient manner (using quadratically many queries, of course). Our main result regarding approx-
imately stable marriages implies that such a first stage cannot be implemented using significantly
less communication or fewer queries than finding an exactly stable marriage. We further discuss
implications and interpretations of this result in Section 7.
Comparison with Blocking-Pairs Approximate Stability There does not appear to be
consensus in the literature on precisely how to quantify the (in)stability of a marriage with respect
to the participants’ preferences. A common notion of approximate stability is the requirement
for a marriage to have relatively few blocking pairs; see, e.g. [9]. For example, one can define
the blocking-pairs instability of a marriage µ, which we denote by bp(µ), to be the number of
blocking pairs, divided by n · (n− 1) (where this divisor is the total number of “potential blocking
pairs” in a perfect marriage, i.e. woman-man pairs who are not married to each other). As we
now observe, having small divorce distance to stability is a strictly more demanding condition than
having small blocking-pairs instability — that is, divorce distance to stability is a finer measure of
instability than blocking-pairs instability.
Proposition 2.1 (Small Divorce Distance Implies, but is Not Implied by, Few Blocking Pairs).
Let W = {w1, . . . , wn} and M = {m1, . . . ,mn}.
11In fact, one may argue that real-world marriages are formed in a similar manner: since no person can meet (and
form preferences regarding) all of their potential spouses, they meet a relatively small number of potential spouses
and marry based on the information gathered until that point. However, they do not stop meeting new people at
that point in time. Over time, they may divorce their spouses in favor of spouses that they find more suitable.
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(a) For every PW and PM , if a marriage µ is (1− ε)-stable for some ε, then bp(µ) ≤ 2ε
(b) There exist full preference lists PW and PM , and a perfect marriage µ, such that µ induces
only a single blocking pair (so bp(µ) = 1n(n−1)), yet d(µ) = n (so µ is not (1− ε)-unstable for
any ε > 0).
Proof. For Part (a), suppose that µ is (1− ε)-stable for some ε > 0. Therefore, d(µ) = εn, and by
the definition of d(µ) there is some stable marriage µ′ such that µ and µ′ share (1− ε)n pairs. Let
W ′ and M ′ denote the sets of women and men, respectively, whose partners are the same in µ and
µ′, so that |W ′| = |M ′| = (1− ε)n. Since µ′ is stable, there are no blocking pairs (w,m) ∈W ′×M ′
with respect to µ′, and therefore there are no such pairs with respect to µ. Therefore, any blocking
pair (m,w) with respect to µ must have w /∈ W ′ or m /∈ M ′ (or both). Since there are only εn
choices of such w (resp. of such m), the total number of blocking pairs induced by µ is less than
2εn(n− 1), and so bp(µ) ≤ 2ε, as required.
For Part (b), we define full preference lists as follows. Each woman wi prefers the men in
order: m1 wi m2 wi · · · wi mn. Similarly, each man mj for j ≥ 2 prefers the women in order:
w1 mj w2 mj · · · mj wn. Finally, the preference list of m1 is defined as follows:
w1 m1 wn m1 w2 m1 w3 m1 · · · m1 wn−1.
A straightforward argument shows that the marriage µ′ = {(wi,mi) | i ∈ [n]} is the unique stable
marriage for these preference lists.12 Consider now the marriage µ defined by
µ = {(w1,m2), (w2,m3), . . . , (wn−1,mn), (wn,m1)} .
The pair (w1,m1) is the only blocking pair induced by µ (thus bp(µ) =
1
n(n−1)). However, µ∩µ′ = ∅,
so d(µ) = n.
The fact that the divorce distance is a finer measure of instability than blocking-pairs instability
makes it easier for us to prove lower bounds on the complexity of finding (1− ε)-stable marriages.
(Indeed, we do not know if similar lower bounds apply to finding a marriage µ satisfying bp(µ) ≤ ε;
see the discussion in Section 7.) Which of these two measures of instability is more appropriate,
though, depends on the given context. One justification for the use of blocking-pairs instability
is that bp(µ) is exactly the probability that a uniformly random pair (w,m) ∈ (W ×M) \ µ is a
blocking pair. Thus, if bp(µ) is small, it is perhaps unlikely that any instability will be detected,
say, by randomly probing potential blocking pairs.
In many real-world matching markets, partnerships are formed with incomplete knowledge
about the market, and the participants continue to learn about the market after an initial matching
is formed. In such situations, it is reasonable to expect that participants will eventually discover
instabilities if any are present in the initial matching. Depending on how the market responds
to instabilities, the number of blocking pairs and the divorce distance can each be interpreted
as a natural measure of the social cost of the instability. If the participants are obligated to
remain in the initial matching, then blocking-pairs instability can be viewed as quantifying the
total “suffering” of participants due to their awareness of being part of a blocking pair. If, on
the other hand, participants are allowed to act on the instability, but must pay some cost to
break existing partnerships, then the divorce distance to stability quantifies the (minimum) cost
for achieving stability.
12For example, one can prove by induction on i that (w1,m1), (w2,m2), . . . , (wi,mi) must be in any stable marriage
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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2.2 Communication Complexity
We work in Yao’s [36] model of two-party communication complexity (see [20] for a survey). Con-
sider a scenario where two agents, Alice and Bob, hold values x and y, respectively, and wish to
collaborate in performing some computation that depends on both x and y. Such a computation
typically requires the exchange of some data between Alice and Bob. The communication cost
of a given protocol (i.e. distributed algorithm) for such a computation is the number of bits that
Alice and Bob exchange under this protocol in the worst case (i.e. for the worst (x, y)); the com-
munication complexity of the computation that Alice and Bob wish to perform is the lowest
communication cost of any protocol for this computation. Generalizing, we also consider random-
ized communication complexity, defined analogously using randomized protocols that for every
given fixed input, produce a correct output with probability at least 23 .
13
Of particular interest to us is the disjointness function, DISJ. Let n ∈ N and let Alice
and Bob hold subsets A,B ⊆ [n], respectively. The value of the disjointness function is 1 if
A ∩ B = ∅, and 0 otherwise. We can also consider DISJ as a Boolean function by identify-
ing A and B with their respective characteristic vectors x¯ = (xi)
n
i=1 and y¯ = (yi)
n
i=1, defined
by xi = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ A and yj = 1 ⇐⇒ j ∈ B. Thus, we can express DISJ using the Boolean
formula DISJ(x¯, y¯) = ¬∨ni=1(xi ∧ yi). All of our results heavily rely on the following result of
Kalyanasundaram and Schintger [18] (see also Razborov [28]):
Theorem 2.4 (Communication Complexity of DISJ [18, 28]). Let n ∈ N. The randomized (and
deterministic) communication complexity of calculating DISJ(x¯, y¯), where x¯ ∈ {0, 1}n is held by
Alice and y¯ ∈ {0, 1}n is held by Bob, is Θ(n). Further, this lower bound holds even for unique
disjointness, i.e. if we require that the inputs x¯ and y¯ are either disjoint or uniquely intersecting:
|x¯ ∩ y¯| ≤ 1.
Our results regarding lower bounds on communication complexities all follow from defining
suitable embeddings of DISJ into various problems regarding stable marriages, i.e. mapping x¯
and y¯ into suitable marriage markets (more specifically, mapping x¯ into PW and y¯ into PM ), such
that finding a stable marriage (or solving any of the other problems from Theorem 1.1) reveals the
value of DISJ. Some of our proofs (namely those presented in Section 5) indeed assume that the
input to DISJ satisfies |x¯ ∩ y¯| ≤ 1.
3 Main Results
The survey of our main results begins with the result that directly implies our answer to Knuth’s
question [19] regarding the necessity of quadratic complexity for finding a stable marriage.
Theorem 3.1 (Communication Complexity of Finding an Approximately-Stable Marriage). Let(
W = {w1, . . . , wn},M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, PW , PM
)
be a marriage market with full preference lists,
where PW is held by Alice and PM is held by Bob, and let 0 ≤ ε < 12 . The randomized (and
deterministic) communication complexity of finding a (1 − ε)-stable marriage in (W,M,PW , PM)
is Ω(n2).
We note that in particular, setting ε = 0 in Theorem 3.1 shows that finding an (exactly) stable
marriage requires Ω(n2) communication. Recall, though, that Knuth’s question is phrased not with
respect to communication complexity, but with respect to computational complexity. To answer
13The results of this paper hold verbatim even if the constant 2
3
is replaced with any other fixed probability p with
1
2
< p ≤ 1.
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Knuth’s question, we reinterpret Theorem 3.1 using a standard argument that shows that the
query complexity of a problem (that is, the worst-case number of Boolean queries any algorithm
that solves this problem must make) is at least its communication complexity.
Corollary 3.1 (Query Complexity of Finding an Approximately-Stable Marriage). Let
(
W =
{w1, . . . , wn},M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, PW , PM
)
be a marriage market with full preference lists, and let
0 ≤ ε < 12 . Any randomized (or deterministic) algorithm that uses any type of Boolean queries
to the women’s and (separately) to the men’s preferences to find a (1− ε)-stable marriage requires
Ω(n2) queries in the worst case.
To see how Corollary 3.1 follows from Theorem 3.1, suppose there is a randomized algorithm A
that computes a (1− ε)-stable marriage using B Boolean queries to the women and men. We will
use A to construct a B-bit communication protocol for the approximate stable marriage problem.
The protocol works as follows. Alice and Bob both simulate A. Whenever A queries the women’s
preferences, Alice sends the result of the query to Bob (since Alice knows the women’s preferences).
Symmetrically, whenever A queries the men’s preferences, Bob sends the result of the query to Alice.
This protocol uses B bits of communication. Thus, by Theorem 3.1, we must have B = Ω(n2), as
desired.
Having given an answer (up to a factor of logn; see Open Question 1.1 in the introduction) to
Knuth’s question on the complexity of finding a stable marriage, one may ask how robust this answer
is to variations in the studied problem. We have already shown that this answer is robust in one
sense: the same lower bound applies also to finding approximately stable marriages. This shows that
the hardness is not a consequence of some delicate phenomenon driven by the exact stability of the
desired outcome. (Since any stable marriage is also (1−ε)-stable, then allowing also approximately-
stable marriage introduces additional possible solutions, so could have conceivably eased the task.)
Another aspect of the robustness of our lower bound relates to Gusfield’s question [14] regarding
verifying the stability of a marriage: is it any easier to verify the correctness of a single concretely-
proposed solution to the stable marriage problem? Setting an even higher bar of robustness, one
can ask the following variant of Gusfield’s question: say that we are given a marriage that is not
a “borderline stable” marriage. That is, this marriage is guaranteed to be either exactly stable or
very far from stable. Would it still be as hard to differentiate between these two cases assuming all
“borderline” cases have been ruled out? Generalizing Knuth’s question in a different direction, one
may also wonder if answering highly localized queries about the stable marriages in the market is
any easier than finding a stable marriage. For example, is it easier to determine if a given woman-
man pair is married in some (or in every) stable marriage?14 We complement Theorem 3.1 by
showing that our quadratic lower bound applies to any and all of the above, and even more.
Theorem 3.2 (Communication Complexity of Stable-Marriage Related Problems). Let
(
W =
{w1, . . . , wn},M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, PW , PM
)
be a marriage market with full preference lists, where
PW is held by Alice and PM is held by Bob. The randomized (and deterministic) communication
complexity of solving any of the following problems is Ω(n2).
(a) determining whether a given marriage µ is stable or ε-unstable, for fixed ε with 0 ≤ ε < 1.
(b) determining whether a given pair of participants is contained in some/every stable marriage.
(c) finding any εn pairs that appear in some/every stable marriage, for fixed ε with 0 < ε ≤ 1.
14See Appendix C for analogous results also for another natural localized query that arises in the context of
incomplete preference lists: determining whether a given participant is single in some (equivalently, in every) stable
marriage.
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Similarly to above, we note that setting ε = 0 in Theorem 3.2(a) shows that verifying that
a given marriage is (exactly) stable requires Ω(n2) communication. We also note that unlike
the case of Theorem 3.1, where there is still a gap of log n that prevents us from completely
understanding the communication complexity of finding a stable marriage (see Open Question 1.1
in the introduction), this Ω(n2) lower-bound on the communication complexity of verifying the
stability of a given marriage is tight: exhaustively querying all pairs of participants to na¨ıvely
check for the existence of a blocking pair requires Θ(n2) bits of communication in the worst case.15
For the other problems analyzed in Theorem 3.2, a similar gap of log n remains: it is possible to show
that O(n2 log n) communication suffices, due to a deterministic algorithm given by Gusfield [14] for
enumerating all pairs that belong to at least one stable marriage in O(n2 log n) Boolean queries,
but the question of a tight bound for these problems remains open as well.
As with Theorem 3.1 yielding Corollary 3.1, the same standard argument gives a query-
complexity analogue of Theorem 3.2:
Corollary 3.2 (Query Complexity of Stable-Marriage Related Problems). Let
(
W = {w1, . . . , wn},
M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, PW , PM
)
be a marriage market with full preference lists. Any randomized (or
deterministic) algorithm that uses any type of Boolean queries to the women’s and (separately) to
the men’s preferences to solve any of the following problems requires Ω(n2) queries in the worst
case:
(a) determining whether a given marriage µ is stable or ε-unstable, for fixed ε with 0 ≤ ε < 1.
(b) determining whether a given pair of participants is contained in some/every stable marriage.
(c) finding any εn pairs that appear in some/every stable marriage, for fixed ε with 0 < ε ≤ 1.
The variety of the problems covered in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 conveys the main message of this
paper: Roughly speaking, answering practically any meaningful basic question regarding a stable
marriage in a marriage market, requires a quadratic number of queries, i.e. nearly amounts to
querying the entire preference structure.
The proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are given in Section 5.2. As we show there, all of these
results can be proven by carefully embedding disjointness into a specially crafted marriage market
that is described in Section 5.1. Before describing this embedding in full detail, we first describe
in Section 4 a far more straightforward embedding of disjointness into a simpler marriage market.
This embedding is just powerful enough to prove that verifying the (exact) stability of a given
marriage requires Ω(n2) communication. We then add slightly more detail to this construction
in order to prove that finding an (exactly) stable marriage also requires Ω(n2) communication.
This gradual introduction to our machinery allows us to first expose the core of the argument that
drives all of our main results (the fundamental relation between disjointness and stability) with
only minimal surrounding detail. The simpler argument further allows readers who are unfamiliar
with embeddings and disjointness to familiarize themselves with more straightforward examples of
such techniques before delving into the intricacies of the general embedding.16
15While Theorem 3.2(a) is phrased so that the marriage µ is known by both Alice and Bob before the protocol
commences, this tight bound still holds even if only one of them knows µ, as the straightforward way of encoding a
marriage between W and M requires O(n logn) bits.
16Furthermore, the proof in Section 4 of the lower bound for finding a stable marriage includes a novel application
of the Rural Hospitals Theorem (Theorem 2.3) to facilitate the embedding of a decision problem (disjointness with no
assumption of unique intersection) into the studied search problem, which we believe may be of independent interest.
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4 Warm Up: Lower Bounds for Exact Stability
In this section, we give direct proofs of our lower bounds for the communication complexity of
finding or verifying an exactly stable marriage. We prove these lower bounds by embedding suitably
large instances of DISJ into the problems of finding a stable marriage or verifying the stability of
some marriage. Thus, by Theorem 2.4 we obtain the desired lower bounds on the corresponding
communication complexities. We note that the construction given in this section does not assume
the input to DISJ to be uniquely intersecting.
Definition 4.1. Let n ∈ N. We denote the set of pairs of distinct elements of {1, . . . , n} by
[n]2 =
{
(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2 | i 6= j}. We note that ∣∣[n]2∣∣ = n · (n− 1).
For the duration of this section, let n ∈ N, and let W = {w1, . . . , wn} and M = {m1, . . . ,mn}
be disjoint sets such that |W | = |M | = n. Let µid be the perfect marriage in which wi is married to
mi for every i. To lower-bound the communication complexity of verifying the stability of a given
marriage, we embed disjointness into verification of stability.
Lemma 4.1 (Disjointness ↪→ Verifying Stability). There exist functions PW : {0, 1}[n]2 → F(W,M)
and PM : {0, 1}[n]2 → F(M,W ) such that for every x¯ = (xij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈ {0, 1}[n]
2
and y¯ =
(yij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈ {0, 1}[n]
2
, the following are equivalent.
• µid is stable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯)
• DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1.
Proof. To define PW (x¯), for every i we define the preference list of wi to consist of all mj such that
xij = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by mi, followed by all other men in arbitrary
order. Similarly, to define PM (y¯), for every j we define the preference list of mj to consist of all wi
such that yij = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by i), followed by wj , followed by all other women
arbitrary order.
µid is unstable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯) ⇐⇒ there exist (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that mj wi
mi and wi mj wj ⇐⇒ there exist (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that xij = 1 and yij = 1⇐⇒ DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0.
Remark 4.1. A similar argument may be used to embed verification of stability back in disjoint-
ness.
To lower-bound the communication complexity of finding a stable marriage, we embed disjoint-
ness into finding a stable marriage through the intermediate problem of finding a stable marriage
with respect to arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily full) preference lists. This embedding of disjointness
into finding a stable marriage requires some more care than the above embedding into verification
of stability, since unlike in Lemma 4.1 where we have embedded a decision problem (i.e. a problem
for which the answer is Boolean) into a decision problem, here we embed a decision problem into a
search problem (in this case, a problem for which the answer is a marriage). While in Section 5 we
will mitigate this obstacle by assuming that the instance of disjointness that we embed is uniquely
intersecting, here we overcome this obstacle via a novel application of the Rural Hospitals Theorem
(Theorem 2.3), which we believe may be of independent interest.
Lemma 4.2 (Disjointness ↪→ Finding a Stable Marriage (Arbitrary Preferences)). There exist
functions PW : {0, 1}[n]2 → P(W,M) and PM : {0, 1}[n]2 → P(M,W ) such that for every x¯ =
(xij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈ {0, 1}[n]
2
and y¯ = (yij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈ {0, 1}[n]
2
, both of the following hold.
a. If DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1, then µid is the unique stable marriage with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯).
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b. If DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0, then µid is unstable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯).
Proof. To define PW (x¯), for every i we define the preference list of wi to consist of all mj such that
xij = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by mi (with all other men absent). Similarly,
to define PM (y¯), for every j we define the preference list of mj to consist of all wi such that y
i
j = 1,
in arbitrary order (say, sorted by i), followed by wj (with all other women absent).
We first show that µid is stable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯) iff DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1. Indeed,
since every participant is married by µid to someone on their preference list, we have:
µid is unstable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯) ⇐⇒ there exist (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that
mj wi mi and wi mj wj ⇐⇒ there exist (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that xij = 1 and yij = 1 ⇐⇒
DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0.
It remains to show that if µid is stable with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯), then it is the unique
stable marriage with respect to these profiles of preference lists. For the remainder of the proof
assume, therefore, that µid is stable (with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯)). Let µ be a stable marriage
(with respect to these profiles of preference lists). As µid is stable and perfect, by Theorem 2.3,
since µ is stable, it is perfect as well. Therefore, each p ∈ W ∪M is married by µ to someone
on the preference list of p, and so p weakly prefers µ over µid, as in the latter p is married to the
last person on the preference list of p. Thus, µid is both the W -pessimal stable marriage and the
M -pessimal stable one, and so, by Corollary 2.1, µid is the unique stable marriage.
Our lower bound on the communication complexity of finding a stable marriage with respect to
full preference lists follows from Lemma 4.2 by showing that we can embed the problem of finding a
stable marriage with respect to possibly-partial preference lists into finding a stable marriage with
respect to full preference lists. See Appendix B for details.
The techniques used to prove Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 can also be used to prove Theorem 3.2(b)
— see Appendix C. Although Theorem 3.2(b) shows that determining the marital status of a fixed
pair (w,m) requires Ω(n2) communication, we do not know how to prove a similar lower bound for
finding some married couple (see Open Problem 7.3 in Section 7). In the next section, we however
show a weaker related result, namely that finding any constant fraction of the couples married
in a stable marriage requires Ω(n2) communication (Theorem 3.2(c)). This result stems from
a more elaborate embedding, which also yields our main results regarding approximate stability
(Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2(a)).
5 General Proof of Main Results
5.1 Embedding Disjointness into Preferences
Similarly to the proofs given in Section 4, the proofs of the remaining results from Section 3 follow
from embedding suitably large instances of DISJ into various problems regarding (approximately)
stable marriages. In order to prove these remaining results, we reconstruct the embeddings to have
the property that small changes in the participants’ preferences yield very large changes in the global
structure of the stable marriages for these preferences. Informally, we construct the preferences so
that resolving blocking pairs resulting from such small changes in participants’ preferences creates
large rejection chains that ultimately affect most married couples.
5.1.1 Preference Description
Let n ∈ N and let W and M be disjoint such that |W | = |M | = n. We divide the participants into
three sets: high , mid and low , which we denote Wh, Wm and Wl respectively for the women and
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Mh, Mm and Ml respectively for the men. These sets have sizes
|Wh| = |Mh| = 12δn
|Wm|= |Mm|= 12(1− δ)n
|Wl| = |Ml| = 12n
where δ is a parameter with 0 < δ ≤ 1, to be chosen later. The low and mid participants preferences
will be fixed, while we will use the preferences of the high participants to embed an instance of
disjointness of size (δn)2/4. We assume that the participants are
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} , M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} ,
where in both cases the first δn/2 participants are high, the next (1 − δ)n/2 participants are mid
and the remaining n/2 participants are low. Since the low and mid participants’ preferences are
the same for all instances, we describe those first. As before, the participants’ preferences are
symmetric in the sense that the men’s and women’s preferences are constructed analogously.
low participants The low women’s preferences over men are “in order”: m1  m2  · · ·  mn
(and symmetrically for low men, whose preference over women are “in order”). In particu-
lar, each low participant prefers all high participants over all mid participants over all low
participants.
mid participants The mid participants prefer low participants over high participants over mid
participants. Within each group, the preferences are “in order.” Specifically, the mid women
have preferences mn/2+1  mn/2+2  · · ·  mn  m1  m2  · · ·  mn/2, and symmetrically
for the men.
high participants We use the preferences of each of the high participants to encode a bit vector
of length δn/2. Together, the men and women’s preferences thus encode an instance of DISJ
of size (δn)2/4. For each wi ∈ Wh, we denote her bit vector xi1, . . . , xiδn/2; the preference list
of wi, from most-preferred to least-preferred, is:
1. men mj ∈Mh such that xij = 1;
2. men m ∈Ml;
3. men m ∈Mm;
4. men mj ∈Mh such that xij = 0.
Within each group, the preferences are once again “in order”, i.e. sorted by numeric index.
The men’s preferences are constructed analogously, with each man mj encoding the bit vector
y1j , . . . , y
δn/2
j and preferring first and foremost women wi ∈Wh such that yij = 1.
5.1.2 Stable Marriage Description
Lemma 5.1. Any instance of the stable marriage problem with preferences described above corre-
sponding to DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1 has a unique stable marriage µ1 given by (see the left side of Figure 1)
µ1 =
{
(mi, wi+n/2)
∣∣ i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2}
∪ {(mi+n/2, wi) ∣∣ i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2} .
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Mm
Wl
Wh
Wm
Ml
Mm
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Ml
Figure 1: The (unique) stable marriages µ1 for disjoint (left) and µ0 for uniquely-intersecting (right)
instances of the preferences described in Section 5.1.1.
Proof. Let µ be a stable marriage; we will show that µ = µ1. We first argue that every high and
mid participant is married to a low participant in µ. Suppose to the contrary that some w = wi for
i ≤ n/2 is married to some m = mj with j ≤ n/2 in µ. By the definition of the preferences and the
assumption that DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1, at least one of w and m prefers every low participant over their
spouse. Assume without loss of generality that w prefers all m′ = mj′ with j′ > n/2 over m. That
is, w prefers all low men over her spouse m. Since w is married to a medium or high man, there
must be some low man m′ that is married to a low woman w′. But m′ prefers all high and medium
women over w′. In particular, he prefers w over w′. Therefore, (w,m′) is a blocking pair, so µ is
not stable. Thus any stable marriage must marry low participants to mid or high participants and
vice versa.
Now we argue that if (wi,mj+n/2) ∈ µ, then we must have i = j. The argument for pairs
(wi+n/2,mj) is identical. Suppose that (wi,mj+n/2) ∈ µ with i < j. Then there is some j′ < j
such that m′ = mj′+n/2 is married to w′ = wi′ with i′ > i. But then (wi,m′) mutually prefer each
other, contradicting the stability of µ. We arrive at a similar contradiction if i > j, hence we must
have i = j, as desired.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose we have a stable marriage instance with preferences described above corre-
sponding to DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0, with x¯ and y¯ uniquely intersecting. Let xαβ = y
α
β = 1 be the uniquely-
intersecting entry of x¯, y¯. In this case, there exists a unique stable marriage µ0 given by (see the
right side of Figure 1)
µ0 = {(wα,mβ)} ∪
{
(wi,mi+n/2)
∣∣ i < α}
∪ {(wi+n/2,mi) ∣∣ i < β}
∪ {(wi,mi+n/2−1), α < i ≤ n/2}
∪ {(wi+n/2−1,mi), β < i ≤ n/2} ∪ {(wn,mn)} .
Proof. We first argue that (wα,mβ) ∈ µ for any stable marriage µ for the preferences described
above. Since µ is stable, if (mα, wβ) /∈ µ, then at least one of wα and mβ, say wα, must be married
to someone she prefers over mβ. From wα’s preferences, this implies that (wα,m) ∈ µ for some
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m = mj with j < β for which x
α
j = 1. Since the instance of DISJ is uniquely intersecting, we must
have yαj = 0. Thus m prefers all low women over wα. Since at most n/2− 1 medium and high men
are married to low women (indeed m is a high man married to a high woman) and there are n/2
low women, some low woman w is married to a low man. But then w and m mutually prefer each
other, hence forming a blocking pair. Thus, we must have (wα,mβ) ∈ µ.
The remainder of the proof of the lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.1 if we remove
wα and mβ from all the participants’ preferences.
Lemma 5.3. The marriages µ0 and µ1 from the previous two lemmas satisfy d(µ0, µ1) ≥ (1− δ)n.
Proof. This follows from the following two observations:
1. All mid women and men Mm ∪Wm have different spouses in µ0 and µ1.
2. No mid women are married to mid men in either µ0 or µ1.
From these facts, we can conclude that d(µ0, µ1) = n− |µ0 ∩ µ1| ≥ |Wm|+ |Mm| = (1− δ)n.
5.2 Derivation of Main results
In this section we use the construction of Section 5.1 to prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 from Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol (between Alice
and Bob) that outputs a (1 − ε)-stable marriage µ using B bits of communication. As ε < 1/2,
there exists δ sufficiently small such that ε < (1−δ)/2. Suppose Π outputs a (1−ε)-stable marriage
µ for the preferences described in Section 5.1.1. If DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1, then by Lemma 5.1, µ1 is the
unique stable marriage, so d(µ, µ1) ≤ εn.
Suppose DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0. By Lemma 5.2, µ0 is the unique stable marriage, so d(µ, µ0) ≤ εn <
(1− δ)n/2. Applying Lemma 5.3 and the triangle inequality, we obtain d(µ1, µ) > (1− δ)n/2 > εn.
Thus, if DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1, then d(µ, µ1) < εn and if DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0, then d(µ, µ1) > εn. Given µ,
Alice and Bob can compute d(µ, µ1) without communication, so they can use Π to determine
the value of DISJ(x¯, y¯) using B bits of communication. Thus, B = Ω(n2) by Theorem 2.4, as
desired.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. For Part (a), suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol that
determines whether a given marriage µ is stable or ε-unstable with respect to given preferences
using B bits of communication. As ε < 1, there exists δ sufficiently small such that 1− δ > ε. Let
µ1 be the marriage defined in Lemma 5.1; by that lemma, if DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 1, then µ1 is stable (with
respect to the preferences described in Section 5.1.1). By Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3, if DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0,
then µ1 is ε-unstable. Thus, if Π determines whether µ1 is stable or ε-unstable, then Π also
determines the value of DISJ(x¯, y¯), hence B = Ω(n2) by Theorem 2.4.
For Part (b), suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol that for a given pair
(w,m) determines whether (w,m) ∈ µ for some (every) stable marriage µ using B bits of commu-
nication. Set δ = 1. By choosing preferences as in Section 5.1.1 and taking (w,m) = (wn,mn), by
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, (w,m) is in some (equivalently every) stable marriage for the given preferences
if and only if DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0. Thus, once again by Theorem 2.4, B = Ω(n2).
Finally, for Part (c), suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol that outputs εn
pairs contained in some (every) stable marriage using B bits of communication. Choose preferences
as described in the Section 5.1.1 with some 0 < δ < ε, say δ = ε/2. Recall from the proof
of Lemma 5.3 that no participants in Wm and Mm are ever married to one another in a stable
marriage. Therefore, since |Wm| + |Mm| = (1 − δ)n > (1 − ε)n and since Π outputs εn pairs, we
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have that Π must output some pair (w,m) with w ∈ Wm or m ∈ Mm. Recall from the proof of
Lemma 5.3 that knowing the stable spouse of any participant in Wm or Mm reveals the value of
DISJ(x¯, y¯). Thus, by Theorem 2.4, B = Ω(n2).
6 Computing Distance to Stability
In this section, we describe an efficient method for computing the divorce distance to stability of a
given marriage, µ. Recall that the divorce distance to stability is given by
d(µ) = min
µ′∈M
d(µ, µ′) where d(µ, µ′) = n− ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣ .
In fact, our algorithm solves the following general problem, which we believe may be of independent
interest: given a marriage market
(
W,M,PW , PM
)
and an arbitrary marriage µ, find a stable
marriage µ′ that shares the greatest number of pairs with µ. Since the setM of all stable marriages
can be exponentially large [19, 17, 15], brute-force computation of d(µ) is infeasible. Fortunately,
by exploiting the structure of M, we are able to efficiently reduce the computation of d(µ) to a
max-flow/min-cut problem of size quadratic in n. Thus, any number of efficient algorithms may be
applied to compute d(µ).
6.1 The Rotation Poset and Digraph
Our exposition follows the work of Gusfield [14] and of Irving and Leather [17] (see also [15]). Let
µ be a stable marriage. A rotation ρ exposed by µ is a sequence of pairs (w0,m0), (w1,m1), . . . ,
(wr−1,mr−1) ∈ µ such that for each i, wi+1 is the first woman on mi’s preference list that
prefers mi to her partner mi+1 in µ (where addition is conducted modulo r). Given µ and ρ,
we form a marriage called the elimination of ρ from µ, denoted µ/ρ, which contains the pairs
(w1,m0), (w2,m1), . . . , (w0,mr−1), in addition to all pairs from µ that are not part of the rotation ρ.
It is straightforward to verify that µ/ρ is a stable marriage.
Let µ0 denote the M -optimal stable marriage (the marriage found by the Gale-Shapley al-
gorithm). Irving and Leather [17] prove that every stable marriage can be obtained from µ0 by
successively eliminating a unique set of rotations that appear in µ0 and subsequent stable marriages.
Given a stable marriage µ, let Sµ denote this unique set of rotations, which can be eliminated (start-
ing at µ0) to obtain µ. (Sµ may contain some rotations that are not exposed in µ0, but only in
subsequent marriages.)
We denote the set of all rotations exposed in one or more stable marriages inM by Π(M). We
endow Π(M) with a partial order ≺ where ρ ≺ σ if ρ ∈ Sµ for every µ ∈M in which σ is exposed.
In other words, ρ ≺ σ if whenever σ is eliminated during the construction of a stable marriage by
elimination from µ0, it is the case that ρ has been eliminated before σ. A subset S ⊆ Π(M) is
(downward) closed if for all σ ∈ S and ρ ≺ σ, we have that ρ ∈ S. Irving and Leather prove the
following remarkable correspondence between closed subsets of Π(M) and stable marriages.
Theorem 6.1 (Irving and Leather [17]). The map µ 7→ Sµ is a bijection between M and the set
of closed subsets of Π(M).
For algorithmic purposes, it is advantageous to have a sparse representation of the partial
order ≺ on Π(M), which preserves its closed subsets. To this end, Gusfield [14] proved the
following theorem. For the remainder of this section, we use the standard notation O˜ to suppress
log n factors, which we find less interesting in the context of our discussion of time complexity in
this section (in contrast to the discussion of communication and query complexity in the rest of
this paper).
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Theorem 6.2 (Gusfield [14]). There exists a directed acyclic graph G(M) with vertices Π(M),
called the rotation digraph, whose transitive closure is the partial order ≺ on Π(M). (That
is, a path from a vertex ρ to a vertex σ exists iff ρ ≺ σ.) G(M) can be computed from the full
preferences of all participants in time O˜(n2). In particular, the edge and vertex sets of G(M) both
have cardinality O(n2).
6.2 Rotation Weights
In this section, we show how to assign weights to rotations ρ ∈ Π(M) in such a way that d(µ, µ′)
can be computed directly from d(µ, µ0) and Sµ′ . Let ρ be any rotation and µ
′ a stable marriage in
which ρ is exposed. For any marriage µ, we define the weight γ of ρ relative to µ by
γµ(ρ) =
∣∣µ ∩ (µ′/ρ)∣∣− ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣ .
(The absence of µ′ from the notation γµ(ρ) becomes clear in Eq. 1 below.) That is, γµ(ρ) is the net
change, following the elimination of ρ from µ′, in the number of pairs contained in the intersection
of µ and µ′. We note that γµ(ρ) can be computed directly from ρ (without being given an explicit
stable marriage µ′ which exposes ρ). Specifically, letting ρ′ = {(w1,m0), (w2,m1), . . . , (w0,mr−1)}
be the set of pairs replacing ρ when eliminating ρ from any stable marriage,17 we have
γµ(ρ) =
∣∣µ ∩ ρ′∣∣− |µ ∩ ρ| . (1)
Lemma 6.1. For any marriage µ and stable marriage µ′ ∈M,∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣ = |µ ∩ µ0|+ ∑
ρ∈Sµ′
γµ(ρ),
where µ0 is the M -optimal stable marriage.
Proof. We argue by induction on
∣∣Sµ′∣∣. If Sµ′ = ∅, then µ′ = µ0, so the result is immediate.
Suppose the claim is true for µ′ and σ is a rotation exposed in µ′, then by the induction hypothesis
and by definition of γµ(σ),∣∣µ ∩ (µ′/σ)∣∣ = ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣+ (∣∣µ ∩ (µ′/σ)∣∣− ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣) = |µ ∩ µ0|+ ∑
ρ∈Sµ′
γµ(ρ) + γµ(σ),
which gives the desired result.
Applying Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.3. Let µ be a marriage. Then
d(µ) = d(µ, µ0)−max
S
∑
ρ∈S
γµ(ρ),
where the maximum is taken over closed subsets S ⊆ Π(M) (and where µ0 is the M -optimal stable
marriage).
17Note that in general, ρ′ is not a rotation.
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Proof. By Lemma 6.1, for any stable marriage µ′,
d(µ, µ′) = n− ∣∣µ ∩ µ′∣∣ = n− |µ ∩ µ0| − ∑
ρ∈Sµ′
γµ(ρ) = d(µ, µ0)−
∑
ρ∈Sµ′
γµ(ρ).
By Theorem 6.1, µ′ 7→ Sµ′ is a bijection onto the set of closed subsets of Π(M). Thus,
d(µ) = min
µ′∈M
d(µ, µ′) = d(µ, µ0)−max
S
∑
ρ∈S
γµ(ρ),
as desired.
6.3 Reduction to Max-Flow/Min-Cut
We now wish to apply Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 to efficiently calculate d(µ). The divorce distance
d(µ, µ0) can easily be computed in O˜(n2) time by using the Gale-Shapley algorithm to compute µ0.
Since the partial order ≺ on Π(M) is the transitive closure of G(M) (where G(M) is the rotation
digraph described in Theorem 6.2), the closed subsets of ≺ are precisely the (downward) closed
subsets (vertex sets with no incoming edges) of G(M), and so to compute d(µ) it suffices to
maximize
∑
ρ∈S γµ(ρ) over closed subsets S of G(M). Thus, we have reduced the problem of
computing d(µ) to finding a maximum closed subset (i.e. maximum-weight vertex set with no
incoming edges) in a directed acyclic graph. This problem is well studied, in particular for its
applications to open-pit mining (see, e.g. [27, 16]). For completeness and due to some differences
in terminology between this paper and that of Picard [27], we briefly describe the application to
our specific maximum closed subset problem of Picard’s [27] efficient reduction of maximum closed
subset to max-flow/min-cut.18
Denote the vertex and edge sets of G(M) by V = Π(M) and E respectively. Let
V + = {ρ ∈ V | γµ(ρ) ≥ 0} and V − = {ρ ∈ V | γµ(ρ) < 0} .
We add a source vertex s and a sink vertex t to G(M) to form a new st-graph G˜ = (V˜ , E˜) where
V˜ = V ∪ {s, t} and
E˜ = E ∪ {(s, ρ) ∣∣ ρ ∈ V −} ∪ {(ρ, t) ∣∣ ρ ∈ V +} .
We assign nonnegative capacity c(u, v) to each edge (u, v) ∈ E˜ by
c(u, v) =

∞ (u, v) ∈ E,
γµ(ρ) (u, v) = (ρ, t),
−γµ(ρ) (u, v) = (s, ρ).
Theorem 6.4 (Picard [27]). The sink set (i.e. the set of vertices on the same side as the sink t)
of a minimum st-cut in G˜ is a maximum closed subset in G(M).
In light of Theorem 6.4, we can reduce the computation of d(µ) to known efficient algorithms
for max-flow/min-cut. We summarize the procedure as follows.
18Picard [27] and Hochbaum [16] use the term “closure”/“closed” to refer to an upward closed subset, i.e. a
vertex set with no outgoing edges. This disagrees with Irving and Leather’s [17] (and our) usage of closed to mean
downward closed (vertex set with no incoming edges), which appears to be more prevalent in the stable marriage
literature. For consistency within this paper, when describing Picard’s construction below and when phrasing Picard’s
theorem as Theorem 6.4, we perform the trivial needed modifications (flipping the direction of all edges as well as
the roles of the source and sink vertices) to naturally present Picard’s results with respect to downward rather than
upward closed subsets.
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Algorithm 1 DivorceDistance(µ, PW , PM ) — compute d(µ) with respect to preferences PW , PM .
1. Use the Gale-Shapley algorithm to compute µ0 and compute d(µ, µ0) = n− |µ ∩ µ0|.
2. Construct the rotation digraph G(M) and the related graph G˜.
3. Compute the weights in G˜ by computing γµ(ρ) for each rotation ρ ∈ G(M), using Eq. (1).
4. Find a minimum st-cut in G˜, and let S be the sink set in the cut.
5. Return d(µ, µ0)−
∑
ρ∈S γµ(ρ).
Theorem 6.5. Given a marriage market
(
W,M,PW , PM
)
and a marriage µ, running the procedure
DivorceDistance(µ, PW , PM ) computes the divorce distance to stability d(µ) in time O˜(n4).
We remark that since (PW , PM ) has size Θ˜(n
2), the runtime of DivorceDistance is nearly
quadratic in the input size.
Proof of Theorem 6.5. The correctness of DivorceDistance(µ, PW , PM ) follows immediately from
Theorems 6.3 and 6.4. We analyze the runtime as follows. Step 1 can be computed in time O˜(n2)
using the Gale-Shapley algorithm and brute force computation of d(µ, µ0). For Step 2, by Theorem
6.2, G(M) (and hence G˜) can also be computed in time O˜(n2). The weights in Step 3 can be
computed in linear time for each rotation, so computing all the weights can be accomplished in
time O˜(n3). For Step 4, the min-cut can be computed in time O˜(|E˜||V˜ |) = O˜(n4) using, for
example, Hochbaum’s algorithm [16].
We remark that since Algorithm 1 finds both µ0 and S = Sµ′ for a stable marriage µ
′ closest to
µ, it is a trivial task, which does not increase the asymptotic runtime complexity of Algorithm 1,
to also compute µ′ in addition to computing d(µ) = d(µ, µ′).
7 Commentary and Open Problems
A number of recent papers [2, 12] have touched on various aspects of the amorphic question of
“how much do the preferences of the women in the Gale-Shapley algorithm affect the produced
(M -optimal) stable marriage.” The fact that we prove our lower-bound result in a strong two-
sided communication model (and not a weaker 2n-sided communication model or an even-weaker
query model) allows our results to also be viewed in the context of this line of research. Our
communication lower bounds show that a significant amount of information about the preferences
of the women is indeed needed in order to deduce the M -optimal stable marriage, as well as for
solving any of the other problems described in Corollary 3.2.
One qualitative feature of of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is that a single proposal at any point
can precipitate a cascade of rejections that affects a large portion of the population. Thus, it is
impossible for participants to know if their current partner is their final partner until the algorithm
has terminated. Our results imply that this feature is common to all stable marriage mechanisms
that dynamically refine a marriage and converge to a stable marriage. Indeed, consider any stable
marriage algorithm and arbitrarily divide it into a “first” stage and a “second” stage. A consequence
of Corollary 3.1 along with our novel definition of divorce distance is that if the query complexity
of the first stage is significantly lower than that of querying the entire input, then after the first
stage a large fraction of the participants may not yet be married to their final spouses.
20
In many real-world marriage markets, centralized clearinghouses are employed to prevent unde-
sirable outcomes [29, 31]. Specifically, these clearinghouses were implemented to avoid “unraveling”
— wherein participants are incentivized to match extremely early — as well as instability. While
unraveling is undesirable in its own right, the early binding commitments made in an unraveling
market have been shown to have adverse effects [32, 21, 25, 10], presumably because the early
matches are necessarily made with incomplete knowledge about the market. A consequence of
Corollary 3.2 (specifically, of Part (c)) is that any marriage mechanism that allows even a small
fraction of participants to match in early binding commitments (i.e. before essentially all of the
preferences are queried) cannot generally produce a stable marriage. Thus the empirical phe-
nomenon of instability in decentralized markets where early-accepted proposals are binding, which
was observed in [29, 31], is not merely a feature of the particular marriage mechanisms that arose
in practice, but is a general theoretical feature inherent in the stable marriage problem.
It is interesting to compare the Ω(n2) lower bound that is proved in this paper for the com-
munication complexity of finding an approximately stable marriage to known complexity bounds
for the problem of finding an approximately maximum-weight matching in a bipartite graph. Even
though these two problems seem similar, the latter can be solved with O(n log n) communication [7],
i.e. with significantly less communication than many variants of the former. It is worthwhile to
compare this surprising dissimilarity between these problems with a qualitatively similar message
that emerges from a significantly different, recent line of work [22, 1], which shows that finding a
Pareto-efficient perfect matching requires considerably less strategic reasoning than finding a stable
marriage.
The classic Gale-Shapley algorithm [11] terminates after O(n2) steps, and each step consists of a
message of O(log n) bits. Thus, the Gale-Shapley algorithm provides a communication upper bound
of O(n2 log n) for the problem of finding a stable marriage. As mentioned in the introduction, our
Theorem 3.1 matches this up to a logarithmic factor, but it is not immediately clear how to close
this gap.
Open Problem 7.1. What is the communication complexity of finding a stable marriage?
Our definition of (1 − ε)-stability is nonstandard. A more common notion of approximate
stability is that a marriage induce few (say, at most εn2) blocking pairs (see [9]). As shown in
Propositions 2.1, the blocking-pairs notion of approximate stability is strictly coarser than ours. It
is therefore natural to ask if the Ω(n2) communication lower bound of Theorem 3.1 holds as well
with respect to the more challenging concept of blocking-pairs approximate stability.
Open Problem 7.2. Is there a protocol Π that computes a marriage with at most εn2 blocking
pairs using o(n2) communication?
Recently, Ostrovsky and Rosenbaum [26] showed that it is possible to find a marriage with
εn2 blocking pairs for arbitrary ε > 0 using O(1) communication rounds for a distributed model of
computation. While their result does not imply anything nontrivial about the total communication,
we believe their techniques may be relevant for finding o(n2) communication protocols for blocking-
pairs approximate stability (if such protocols exist). Interestingly, an analogue of Theorem 3.2(a)
(or of Corollary 3.2(a)) does not hold for blocking-pairs approximate stability.
Theorem 7.1. For every ε ≥ δ > 0, there exists a randomized communication protocol Π
that determines whether a given marriage µ induces at least εn(n − 1) blocking pairs or at most
(ε− δ)n(n− 1) blocking pairs using O(log n) communication. In particular, Π determines whether
µ is stable or has εn(n− 1) blocking pairs using O(log n) communication.
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Proof sketch. Choose an unmarried pair (w,m) uniformly at random from W ×M . If m prefers w
over his spouse in µ, the men query the women to see if w also prefers m over her spouse in µ using
O(log n) communication. The probability that (w,m) is a blocking pair is precisely ε′, where ε′ is
the fraction of blocking pairs in µ. Repeat this procedure to estimate ε′ to any desired accuracy in
a bounded number of steps depending only on the desired accuracy.
Theorem 3.2(c) shows that any protocol that produces a constant fraction of pairs in a stable
marriage (regardless of which pairs are found) requires Ω(n2) communication. It would be interest-
ing to improve this result (or find an efficient protocol) for finding even a single pair that appears
in a stable marriage.
Open Problem 7.3. What is the communication complexity of finding a single pair (w,m) that
appears in some/every stable marriage?
Finally, we notice that in contrast to Parts (a) and (c) of Theorem 3.2, our statement of
Theorem 3.1 requires that ε < 1/2. It is natural to ask what can be obtained regarding other
values of ε.
Open Problem 7.4. Fix 12 ≤ ε < 1. What is the communication complexity of finding a
(1− ε)-stable marriage?
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A Asymptotic Notation
Throughout this paper, we use standard computer-science asymptotic notation to describe the
order of growth of single-dimensional functions of natural numbers. For example, for a positive
function f , we write f(n) = O(g(n)) where g is also a positive function (usually, one simple to
write down), if there exist positive numbers M and N such that f(n) ≤ M · g(n) for all n > N .
(Equivalently and succinctly, we write f = O(g(n)) if lim supn→∞ f(n)g(n) < ∞.) Intuitively, one
may find it helpful to read the notation f = O(g(n)) as f ∈ O(g), where O(g) is the class of
functions whose order of growth (as n grows large) is at most that of g. This notation allows for
the simplification of the exposition of many results, where the order of magnitude of the result serves
as the main message. For example, for a highly complex function f that satisfies f = O(n2) (that
is, does not grow any faster than g, where g(n) = n2 for all n), instead of specifying f and saying
that some algorithm takes at most f steps, one could concisely say that this algorithm takes at
most O(n2) steps, without the need to explicitly write down the complex function f . The following
table summarizes this and other similar standard “order of growth” notation used throughout this
paper.
Notation Explicit Definition Succinct Definition Informal Meaning
f = O(g(n)) ∃M,N : ∀n > N :
f(n) ≤M · g(n) lim supn→∞
f(n)
g(n) <∞ f grows at most as fast as g
f = Ω
(
g(n)
) ∃M > 0, N : ∀n > N :
f(n) ≥M · g(n) lim infn→∞
f(n)
g(n) > 0 f grows at least as fast as g
f = Θ
(
g(n)
) ∃M > 0,M,N : ∀n > N :
M ·g(n) ≤ f(n) ≤M ·g(n)
f = O(g(n)) &
f = Ω
(
g(n)
) f grows as fast as g
f = o
(
g(n)
) ∀M > 0 : ∃N : ∀n > N :
f(n) ≤M · g(n) lim supn→∞
f(n)
g(n) = 0 f grows slower than g
f = ω
(
g(n)
) ∀M : ∃N : ∀n > N :
f(n) ≥M · g(n) lim infn→∞
f(n)
g(n) =∞ f grows faster than g
B Embedding Arbitrary Preferences into Complete Preferences
This section contains the remaining technical details needed to complete the direct proof that is
given in Section 4 of our lower bound on the communication complexity of finding an exactly stable
marriage.
Definition B.1 (Submarriage). Let W ′ and M ′ be disjoint sets. A marriage µ, between a subset W
of W ′ and a subset M of M ′, is said to be a submarriage of a marriage µ′ between W ′ and M ′,
if for every w ∈W and m ∈M , we have µ′(w) = m iff µ(w) = m.
Lemma B.1 (Finding a Stable Marriage (Arbitrary Preferences) ↪→ Finding a Stable Marriage
(Full Preferences)). Let n ∈ N, and let W , W ′, M and M ′ be pairwise-disjoint sets, each of
cardinality n. There exist functions PW∪W ′ : P(W,M) → F(W ∪W ′,M ∪M ′) and PM∪M ′ :
P(M,W ) → F(M ∪M ′,W ∪W ′) such that for every PW ∈ P(W,M) and PM ∈ P(M,W ), and
for every (possibly imperfect) marriage µ between W and M , the following are equivalent.
• µ is stable with respect to PW and PM .
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• µ is a submarriage of some marriage between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ that is stable with respect
to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ).
Proof.19 DenoteW ={w1, . . . , wn}, M={m1, . . . ,mn}, W ′={w′1, . . . , w′n}, and M ′={m′1, . . . ,m′n}.
To define PW∪W ′(PW ), for every i we define the preference list of wi to consist of her preference
list in PW (in the same order), followed by m
′
i, followed by all other men in arbitrary order; we define
the preference list of w′i to consist of mi, followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Similarly,
to define PM∪M ′(PM ), for every j we define the preference list of mj to consist of his preference
list in PM (in the same order), followed by w
′
j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order; we
define the preference list of m′j to consist of wj , followed by all other women in arbitrary order.
It is straightforward to verify that the lemma holds with respect to these definitions of PW∪W ′
and PM∪M ′ ; the details are left to the reader.
Remark B.1. It is straightforward to embed the problem of finding a stable marriage with respect
to full preference lists in that of finding a stable marriage with respect to arbitrary preference lists,
as the former is a special case of the latter.
C Determining the Marital Status of
a Given Couple or Participant
In this appendix, we give an alternate proof of Part (b) of Theorem 3.2 that uses the construction
of Section 4. We prove Theorem 3.2(b) once again using Theorem 2.4, by embedding disjointness
(without assuming unique intersection) in both problems. We embed disjointness via an interme-
diate problem of determining whether a given participant is single (i.e. not married to anyone) in
some stable marriage, given profiles of arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily full) preference lists.20 We
therefore obtain the same lower bounds for this natural problem as well.
Lemma C.1 (Disjointness ↪→ Is Participant Single?). Let n ∈ N, let W and M be disjoint sets such
that |W | = |M | = 2n, and let p ∈ W ∪M . There exist functions PW : {0, 1}[n]2 → P(W,M) and
PM : {0, 1}[n]2 → P(M,W ) such that for every x¯ = (xij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈ {0, 1}[n]
2
and y¯ = (yij)(i,j)∈[n]2 ∈
{0, 1}[n]2, the following are equivalent.
• p is single in some stable marriage with respect to PW (x¯) and PM (y¯).
• DISJ(x¯, y¯) 6= 0.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that p ∈W and denote w = p. Denote W = {w1, . . . , wn,
w, w′2, w′3, . . . , w′n} and M = {m1, . . . ,mn,m′1, . . . ,m′n}.
To define PW (x¯), for every i we define the preference list of wi to consist of all mj such that x
i
j =
1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by m′i (with all other men absent). We define the
preference list of w to consist of all m′j , in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), with all other men
absent. We define the preference list of every w′i to be empty (these women can be ignored, and are
defined purely for aesthetic reasons — so that W and M be of equal cardinality). To define PM (y¯),
for every j we define the preference list of mj to consist of all wi such that y
i
j = 1, in arbitrary
19Our construction in this proof is essentially a one-to-one version of the many-to-many construction given in
Corollary 31 of [13].
20By Theorem 2.3 (in conjunction with 2.1), this is equivalent to whether this participant is single in every stable
marriage.
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order (say, sorted by i), with all other women absent. For every j we define the preference list of
m′j to consist of wj , followed by w (with all other women absent).
Let µ′id be the marriage in which wi is married to m
′
i for every i, and in which all other
participants are single. We first show that DISJ(x¯, y¯) 6= 0 iff µ′id is stable, and then show that µ′id
is stable iff w = p is single in some stable marriage; we commence with the former.
We begin by noting that every participant that is married in µ′id is married to someone on their
preference list; therefore, µ′id is stable iff no pair would rather deviate. Obviously, no w
′
i would
rather deviate with anyone. Furthermore, while w would rather deviate with any m′j , these are
all married to their top choices, and so none of them would deviate with w. Since for every i,
the preference list of wi consists of m
′
i and of a subset of {mj}j 6=i, we therefore have that µ′id is
unstable iff there exists (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that both mj wi m′i and wi is on the preference list of
mj . Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2, this holds precisely if there exists (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that
xij = 1 and y
i
j = 1, which holds iff DISJ(x¯, y¯) = 0.
We complete the proof by showing that µ′id is stable iff w = p is single in some stable marriage.
The first direction follows immediately from the fact that w is single in µ′id. For the second direction,
assume that there exists a stable marriage µ in which w is single. By stability of µ and since all
men on the preference list of w have w on their preference list, all such men are married in µ and
prefer their spouses over w. Therefore, for every j, we have that m′j is married to wj in µ. By
stability of µ, every w′i is single in µ. As µ and µ
′
id coincide on all women, we have that µ = µ
′
id.
Therefore, µ′id = µ is stable and the proof is complete.
Corollary C.1 (Complexity of Determining the Marital Status of a Given Participant). The
lower bounds of Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.2 apply also to the problem of determining whether
a given participant p ∈ W ∪M is single in some (equivalently, in every) stable marriage, where
PW ∈ P(W,M) and PM ∈ P(M,W ) are arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily full) preference lists.
Lemma C.2 (Is Participant Single? ↪→ Is Couple Sometimes/Always Married?). Let n ∈ N,
and let W , W ′, M and M ′ be pairwise-disjoint sets, each of cardinality n; let w ∈ W and m′ ∈
M ′. There exist functions PW∪W ′ : P(W,M) → F(W ∪W ′,M ∪M ′) and PM∪M ′ : P(M,W ) →
F(M ∪M ′,W ∪W ′) such that for every PW ∈ P(W,M) and PM ∈ P(M,W ), the following are
equivalent.
• w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and PM .
• w and m′ are married in some marriage between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ that is stable with
respect to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ).
• w and m′ are married in every marriage between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ that is stable with
respect to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma B.1. Denote W = {w1 = w,w2, . . . , wn}, M =
{m1, . . . ,mn}, W ′ = {w′1, . . . , w′n}, and M ′ = {m′1 = m′,m′2, . . . ,m′n}.
To define PW∪W ′(PW ), for every i we define the preference list of wi to consist of her preference
list in PW (in the same order), followed by m
′
i, followed by all other men in arbitrary order; we define
the preference list of w′i to consist of mi, followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Similarly,
to define PM∪M ′(PM ), for every j we define the preference list of mj to consist of his preference
list in PM (in the same order), followed by w
′
j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order; we
define the preference list of m′j to consist of wj , followed by all other women in arbitrary order.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma B.1, we have that w is single in some marriage µ between W
and M that is stable with respect to PW and PM iff w and m
′ are married in some marriage (a
27
corresponding “supermarriage” of µ) between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ that is stable with respect to
PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ). Additionally, by Theorem 2.3 (in conjunction with Theorem 2.1),
we have: w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and
PM ⇐⇒ w is single in every marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and
PM ⇐⇒ w and m′ are married in every marriage between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ that is stable with
respect to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ).
D Verifying the Output of a Given Stable Marriage Mechanism
As noted in Section 3, while our lower bound for verifying the stability of a given marriage is
tight, we do now know whether our lower bound for finding a stable marriage is tight as well. We
note that we do not even know a tight lower bound for verifying whether a given marriage is the
M -optimal stable marriage.
Open Problem D.1. What is the worst-case complexity of verifying whether a given marriage is
the M -optimal stable marriage?
As in the case of Open Problem 1.1, we do not have any o(n2 log n) algorithm for verification of
the M -optimal stable marriage, even randomized and even in the strong two-party communication
model, nor do we have any ω(n2) lower bound, even for deterministic algorithms and even in the
simple comparison model.
In this section, we the derive a Ω(n2) lower bound for verification of the M -optimal stable
marriage. In fact, we show this lower bound not only for verifying the M -optimal stable marriage,
but also for verifying the output of any other stable marriage mechanism.
Definition D.1 (Stable Marriage Mechanism). Let n ∈ N, let W and M be disjoint sets such that
|W | = |M | = n. A stable marriage mechanism is a function f from F(W,M)×F(M,W ) to the
set of perfect marriages betweenW andM , such that for every PW ∈ F(W,M) and PM ∈ F(M,W ),
the marriage f(PW , PM ) is stable with respect to PW and PM .
Example D.1 (M -Optimal Stable Marriage Mechanism). The function fM -Opt, defined such that
fM -Opt(PW , PM ) is the M -optimal stable marriage with respect to PW and PM , is a well-defined
stable marriage mechanism by Theorem 2.1.
Corollary D.1 (Complexity of Computing the Output of a Given Stable Marriage Mechanism).
By Theorem 3.1, we have that for every stable marriage mechanism f , the worst-case randomized
query complexity (as defined in Corollary 3.1) as well as the worst-case communication complexity
of computing f is Ω(n2).
Theorem D.1 (Complexity of Verifying the Output of a Given Stable Marriage Mechanism). Let
n ∈ N, let W and M be disjoint sets such that |W | = |M | = n, fix a stable marriage mechanism
f and let PW ∈ F(W,M) and PM ∈ F(M,W ). Let µid be the perfect marriage in which wi is
married to mi for every i. The worst-case randomized query complexity, as well as the worst-case
randomized communication complexity, of determining whether f(PW , PM ) = µid is Ω(n
2).
Theorem D.1 may be proven either via a direct application of the machinery of Section 5, or
using the machinery of Section 4, with Lemma B.1 replaced by the following lemma.
Lemma D.1. Let n ∈ N, and let W = {w1, . . . , wn}, M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, W ′ = {w′1, . . . , w′n} and
M ′ = {m′1, . . . ,m′n} be pairwise-disjoint sets, each of cardinality n. Let µid be the perfect marriage
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between W and M in which wi is married to mi for every i, and let µ
′
id be the perfect marriage
between W ∪W ′ and M ∪M ′ in which for every i, both wi is married to mi and w′i is married to
m′i. There exist functions PW∪W ′ : P(W,M) → F(W ∪W ′,M ∪M ′) and PM∪M ′ : P(M,W ) →
F(M ∪M ′,W ∪W ′) such that for every PW ∈ P(W,M) and PM ∈ P(M,W ), both of the following
hold.
a. If µid is the unique stable marriage with respect to PW and PM , then µ
′
id is the unique stable
marriage with respect to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ).
b. If µid is unstable with respect to PW and PM , then µ
′
id is unstable with respect to PW∪W ′(PW )
and PM∪M ′(PM ).
Proof. We define PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM ) as in Lemma B.1, only with M ′ appearing sorted
by j (as opposed to in arbitrary order) on the preference lists of W ′, and with W ′ appearing sorted
by i (as opposed to in arbitrary order) on the preference lists of M ′. By Lemma B.1, we have both
that b. holds, and that if µid is the unique stable marriage with respect to PW and PM , then it
is a submarriage of every marriage that is stable with respect to PW∪W ′(PW ) and PM∪M ′(PM );
it is straightforward to show that every “supermarriage” of µid, apart from µ
′
id, is unstable, thus
proving a. as well.
Open Problem D.2. Is there a stable marriage mechanism whose worst-case output verification
complexity is Θ(n2)? Which stable marriage mechanisms have the lowest asymptotic worst-case
output verification complexity?
E Nondeterminism
All the lower bounds in this paper are based upon reductions to the well-studied communication
complexity of the disjointness function. Since the disjointness function also has Θ(n) nonde-
terministic communication complexity [20], it follows that all our lower bounds apply not only
to randomized communication complexity, but also to nondeterministic communication complex-
ity. For nondeterministic communication complexity, the Ω(n2) lower bound for finding a stable
marriage is in fact tight (and so still is the Ω(n2) bound for verification of stability).
For the decision problem of verifying the stability of a given marriage, the co-nondeterministic
communication complexity may be easily seen to be Θ(log n). In contrast, we note that the proof of
Theorem 3.2(b) may be easily adapted to show a Ω(n2) lower bound also for the co-nondeterministic
communication complexities of determining the marital status of a given couple.
Theorem E.1 (Nondeterministic Communication Complexity of Determining the Marital Status
of a Given Couple). In the notation of Theorem 3.2(b), both the nondeterministic and co-nondeter-
ministic communication complexities of determining whether w and m are married in some/every
stable marriage are Ω(n2).
For completeness, we show this lower bound also for the nondeterministic and co-nondeter-
ministic communication complexities of the intermediate problem of determining whether a given
participant is single, which we presented in Appendix C. (This proof also yields Theorem E.1
using the tools of that appendix and of Section 4.) These lower bounds follow from the results of
Appendix C in conjunction with the following lemma.
Lemma E.1 (Is Participant Single? ↪→ ¬ Is Participant Single?). Let n ∈ N, let W and M be sets
such that |W | = |M | = n, and let w′ and m′ such that W , M , {w′} and {m′} are pairwise disjoint;
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let w ∈ W . There exist functions PW∪{w′} : P(W,M) → P(W ∪ {w′},M ∪ {m′}) and PM∪{m′} :
P(M,W )→ P(M ∪ {m′},W ∪ {w′}) such that for every PW ∈ P(W,M) and PM ∈ P(M,W ), the
following are equivalent.
• w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and PM .
• m′ is married in every marriage between W ∪ {w′} and M ∪ {m′} that is stable with respect
to PW∪{w′}(PW ) and PM∪{m′}(PM ).
Proof. To define PW∪{w′}(PW ), we define the preference list of w as her preference list in PW (in
the same order), followed by m′; we define the preference list of every other woman in W as her
preference list in PW (in the same order and with m
′ absent), and define the preference list of w′
to be empty (once again, w′ can be ignored, and is defined purely for aesthetic reasons — so that
W ∪{w′} and M ∪{m′} be of equal cardinality). To define PM∪{m′}(PM ), we define the preference
list of every man in M as his preference list in PM (in the same order and with w
′ absent); we
define the preference list of m′ to consist solely of w.
Directly from definition of PM∪M ′ and PW∪W ′ , we have that a natural bijection µ 7→ µ′ ex-
ists between stable marriages with respect to PW and PM and stable marriages with respect to
PW∪{w′}(PW ) and PM∪{m′}(PM ); this bijection is given by:
• If w is married in µ, then µ′ = µ (with m′ and w′ single in µ′).
• If w is single in µ, then µ′ is the marriage obtained from µ by marrying w to m′ (with w′
once again single in µ′).
Once again by Theorem 2.3 (in conjunction with Theorem 2.1), and by the existence of this bijection,
we have: w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and
PM ⇐⇒ w is single in every marriage between W and M that is stable with respect to PW and PM
⇐⇒ m′ is married in every marriage between W ∪ {w′} and M ∪ {m′} that is stable with respect
to PW∪{w′}(PW ) and PM∪{m′}(PM ).
We note that the nondeterministic lower bound of Ω(n2) for determining whether a given couple
is married in some stable marriage, as well as the co-nondeterministic lower bound of Ω(n2) for
determining whether a given couple is married in every stable marriage (and both the nondetermin-
istic and co-nondeterministic lower bounds of Ω(n2) for determining whether a given participant
is single in some/every stable marriage), is in fact tight. (Recall that we do not know whether any
of these problems can be deterministically or even probabilistically solved using o(n2 log n) com-
munication.) The questions of a tight co-nondeterministic lower bound for the former problem
and a tight nondeterministic lower bound for the latter remain open in all query models. We
note that the latter problem may be solved by checking whether the pair in question is married in
both the M -optimal stable marriage and the W -optimal stable marriage; a O(n2)-Boolean-queries
algorithm (even a nondeterministic one) for verification of the M -optimal stable marriage (see
Open Problem D.1 in Appendix D) would therefore also settle the question of the nondeterministic
communication complexity of this problem.
F Optimality of Deferred Acceptance with respect to
Queries onto Women
Gale and Shapley’s (1962) proof of Theorem 2.1 is constructive, providing an efficient algorithm
for finding the M -optimal stable marriage. In this algorithm, men are asked queries of the form
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“which woman is next on the preference list of man m after woman w?” (or alternatively, “which
woman does man m rank at place k?”), while women are asked queries of the form “whom does
woman w prefer most out of the set of men M˜?”; all of these queries require an answer of length
O(log n) bits.
Dubins and Freedman [8] presented a variant of Gale and Shapley’s algorithm, which runs in the
same worst-case time complexity, but performs a significantly more limited class of queries, namely
only pairwise-comparison queries, onto women. In Open Problem 1.1 in the Introduction, we raise
the question of a tight lower bound for the complexity of finding a stable marriage using only such
queries for both women and men. In this section, we show that regardless of how complex the
queries onto the men may be, no algorithm for finding any stable marriage (and even no algorithm
for verifying the stability of a given marriage, when input a stable marriage) that performs only
pairwise-comparison queries onto women, may perform any less such queries onto them than Dubins
and Freedman’s variant of Gale and Shapley’s algorithm (given the same preference lists). For the
duration of this section, let n ∈ N, let W and M be disjoint sets such that |W | = |M | = n.
Definition F.1 (Pairwise-Comparison Query). A pairwise-comparison query ontoW is a query
of whether mwm′ for some given w∈W and m,m′∈M .
Definition F.2 (Men-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm [8]). The following algorithm is
henceforth referred to as the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm : The algorithm
is initialized with all women and all men being provisionally single , and concludes when no man
is provisionally single. The algorithm is divided into steps, to which we refer as nights. On each
night, an arbitrary provisionally-single man m is chosen, and serenades under the window of the
woman w ranked highest on his preference list among those who have not (yet) rejected him. If w is
provisionally single, then m and w are provisionally married to each other. Otherwise, i.e. if w
is already provisionally married to some man m′, then if m w m′, then w rejects m′, who becomes
provisionally single, and w and m are provisionally married to each other; otherwise, w rejects m,
who remains provisionally single. The algorithm stops when no provisionally-single men remain,
and the couples married by the output marriage are exactly those that are provisionally married
when the algorithm stops.
Theorem F.1 ([8]). Let PW ∈ F(W,M) and PM ∈ F(M,W ) be profiles of full preference lists
for W over M and for M over W , respectively. The men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm
stops after O(n2) nights, and yields the M -optimal stable marriage.
Remark F.1. Let PW ∈ F(W,M) and let PM ∈ F(M,W ). All runs of the men-proposing deferred-
acceptance algorithm (given PW and PM ) perform the same number of pairwise-comparison queries
onto W .
Theorem F.2 (Optimality of Men-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm with respect to Pair-
wise-Comparison Queries onto W ). For any profiles PW ∈ F(W,M) and PM ∈ F(M,W ) of full
preference lists for W over M and for M over W , respectively, every algorithm for finding or ver-
ifying a stable marriage (for the latter — when input any marriage that is stable with respect to
PW and PM ) that only performs pairwise-comparison queries onto W (and arbitrary queries onto
M), performs no less queries onto W than the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, when
input PW and PM .
Remark F.2. An analogous result may similarly be shown to hold with respect to profiles of
arbitrary preference lists, and finding/verifying a possibly-imperfect stable marriage.
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Definition F.3. Let µ be a perfect marriage between W and M . By slight abuse of notation, we
denote the woman married to a man m ∈M in µ by µ(m) instead of µ−1(m).
Proof of Theorem F.2. Let A be a run of the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with re-
spect to PW and PM , and let B be a given run of an algorithm for finding/verifying a stable marriage
with respect to PW and PM . Let Q ⊆W ×M2 be the set of triples (w,m,m′) such that either the
query of whether m w m′ was performed onto W during B and answered positively, or the query of
whether m′ w m was performed onto W during B and answered negatively. By definition, at least
|Q| queries onto W are performed during B. Let µ be the M -optimal stable marriage with respect
to PW and PM , i.e. the marriage output by A. Let R = {(w,m) | w rejects m during A} ⊆W ×M .
By definition, we note that the number of queries onto W during A equals the number of rejections
performed during A, and so, as no woman rejects the same man twice, equals |R|. It is therefore
enough to show that |R| ≤ |Q| in order to complete the proof.
Let µ′ be the output of B if it is a run of an algorithm for finding a stable marriage, or the
input to B if it is a run of an algorithm for verifying stability; either way, µ′ a stable marriage
with respect to PW and PM . We claim that w m µ′(m) for every (w,m) ∈ R. Indeed, as m
serenades under women’s windows during A in descending order of preference, the fact that w
rejects m during A implies w m µ(m). By Theorem F.1, we thus have w m µ(m) m µ′(m),
as claimed. As B guarantees the stability of µ′, it must therefore ascertain that µ′(w) w m for
every (w,m) ∈ R; therefore, as only pairwise-comparison queries are performed onto W during
B, there exists m′ ∈ M such that (w,m′,m) ∈ Q. We have thus shown that R is contained in
the projection of Q over its first and last coordinates, and therefore |R| ≤ |Q|, and the proof is
complete.
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